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FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, and KAY M. 
LEWIS, ESQ., Trustee, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 860499 
Priority 13(b) 
-00O00-
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
As originally set forth in Appellant's Brief, this case 
involves a request for declaratory judgment. Appellant seeks 
review of the trial courtfs award of summary judgment and its 
ruling that First Security Financial Corporation's Trust Deed has 
priority over Rilling's interest in a portion of property upon 
which Rilling's marital residence was located. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Rillingfs reversal of the legal descriptions of the two 
parcels of property, as reflected in his Statement of Facts, was 
an inadvertent error made in connection with the preparation of 
his Brief, but that error in no way affects the issues presented 
for review. 
2. First Security Financial's Statement of Facts makes one 
misstatement. Contrary to its allegations, First Security 
Financial did have notice of Rilling's claim when First Security 
made a loan and secured its interest against property located at 
2810 Fillmore Avenue, Ogden, Utah, because Appellant's lis 
pendens was a matter of public record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rilling's lis pendens was properly recorded. The recital of 
the street address in the document, in conjunction with the legal 
description of one of the two parcels of property comprising a 
single residence which was also set out in the document, was 
sufficient to give notice to First Security of Rilling's interest 





THE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION IN RILLING!S LIS 
PENDENS DOES COMPLY WITH UTAH STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS. 
The purpose of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice 
of potential claims of interest in real property by third 
parties. This policy was clearly spelled out in Hidden Meadows 
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Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), when this 
Court stated, "the sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is to 
give constructive notice of the pendency of proceedings which may 
be derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession." Id. 
at 1248. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-40-2, outlines the 
necessary steps to accomplish this purpose. The recorded notice 
must only contain three things: (1) the names of the parties; 
(2) the object of the action or defense; and (3) a description of 
the property affected. There is no dispute between the parties 
that Rilling1s lis pendens complied with the first two 
requirements. The final requirement was satisfied as well, and 
the description of land given was sufficient to impart notice of 
his interest in the entire marital residence. 
First Security disagrees, and argues the description used 
was not in strict compliance with the statutory requirements. In 
so arguing, First Security basically relies on two cases for its 
policy argument that, in order to constitute constructive notice, 
strict statutory compliance is required. Rilling does not 
disagree with this statement of policy, but does take issue with 
First Security's representation of what is necessary to fulfill 
this obligation of strict compliance. First Security first cites 
Cheyenne National Bank v. Citizens Savings Bank, 391 P.2d 933 
(Wyo. 1964) . In Cheyenne National Bank, the court gave priority 
to a second mortgagee because the first mortgagee completely 
failed to comply with one of two express statutory requirements. 
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Under Wyoming law, the holder of an encumbrance was required to 
(1) file notice of his interest, and (2) concurrently deliver the 
certificate of title to the clerk for notation of the 
encumbrance. The first mortgagee neither could nor did satisfy 
the second requirement because its mortgagor did not have title 
to the trucks at issue in the case. Consequently, Cheyenne 
National Bank is inapplicable to the case before us because 
Rilling did comply with all the statutory requirements of Section 
78-40-2, and the issue then becomes the sufficiency of the steps 
taken. 
First Security also relies on Arapahoe Land Title, Inc., v. 
Contract Financing Ltd., 472 P.2d 754 (Colo. App. 1970), as 
authority that strict compliance is required for the successful 
imparting of constructive notice. However, in Arapahoe, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals went on to define the level of required 
notice: 
The kind of notice required is one 
'reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise the interested 
parties of the pendency of the action.f Id. 
at 756. 
The notice under the facts in Arapahoe was such that it "could 
not be indexed in a manner that would reasonably enable persons 
without actual knowledge of the violation to learn of their 
existence." Id. 
In the present case, Rilling1s lis pendens satisfies the 
Arapahoe standard of sufficient notice as it was reasonably 
calculated, given the circumstances, to apprise First Security of 
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the pendency of a divorce action that would undoubtedly affect 
the entire marital residence. The use of the street address and 
the legal description of one parcel reasonably enabled First 
Security to learn of Rilling1s interest, and, as a result, First 
Security had notice, as required by statute, of Rilling"s 
interest in the entire piece of property. Therefore, Rilling did 
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 78-40-2. 
B. 
THE STRUCTURE OF UTAH'S RECORDATION SYSTEM 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A LIS PENDENS CONTAIN 
LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PROPERTY AFFECTED. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-40-2 and its pertinent 
judicial interpretations require a description of property 
sufficient to give constructive notice of an interest in that 
property to subsequent parties. For its proposition that this 
description must be a legal description, Respondent cites Luthi 
v. Evans, 223 Kan. 622, 576 P.2d 1064 (1978). However, Rilling's 
lis pendens satisfies Luthi's requirement in that: 
It identifies the property or affords the 
means of identification within the instrument 
itself. Id. at 1070. 
While Luthif s "Mother Hubbard" clause did not satisfy this 
standard, Rilling's use of the street address and the legal 
description of one of two parcels making up a marital residence 
does meet this standard. The lis pendens apprised First Security 
that divorce proceedings were pending between its proposed 
borrower and her husband. This, when considered with the 
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descriptions in the instrument itself, was sufficient to afford 
them the necessary means of identification. 
POINT II 
FIRST SECURITY WAS ALERTED TO FACTS THAT 
SHOULD HAVE CAUSED IT TO HAVE DISCOVERED 
RILLING'S CLAIM. 
First Security argues that it had no duty to inquire further 
to discover Rillingfs claim to Parcel B. This position is 
inconsistent with the fact that First Security had knowledge: 
1. Of the entire street address; 
2. Of a legal description of the smaller parcel; 
3. Of the fact that the property was a single marital 
residence; and 
4. Of the fact that divorce proceedings were pending 
between their borrower and Appellant. 
First Security also argues that "the specific legal description 
controls in the event of any conflict or uncertainty." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 17). However, there is no conflict 
between the street address and the legal description in Rilling1s 
lis pendens. First Security cites Am. Jur. 2d, Boundaries, § 64 
for statement of the general rule. It is, however, important to 
note that before this general rule is to be applied, every effort 
is to be made to reconcile the two descriptions. Section 64 of 
Am. Jur. 2nd on Boundaries begins by stating: 
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All parts of the description in a conveyance 
should be allowed to stand if possible, and 
none of the calls should be rejected if they 
can be applied in any reasonable manner; it 
is only in the case of an obvious mistake or 
where there is such a contradiction or 
inconsistency as to render the conveyance 
unintelligible that some of the calls are to 
be rejected. 
Respondent relies on Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979), ^ 
for authority of its position, but in Neeley, the deeds at issue *' x *fy 
were irreconcilable. In the case at Bar, the street address and 
the legal description can be allowed to stand together and be 
consistently construed. Therefore, there is no need to apply the 
general rule that a specific description controls a general one. 
It is consistent with the lis pendens as filed to conclude that 
the notice given pertained to the entire marital residence and 
both parcels of property which comprised that residence. 
CONCLUSION 
Rillingfs lis pendens fully complied with the Utah statutory 
requirements. The use of the street address and legal 
description of one of two parcels constituting a single marital 
residence was sufficient to give the necessary constructive 
notice to First Security Financial. 
In addition, the action affecting the single residence was a 
divorce proceeding. Therefore, the description used by Rilling, 
coupled with the surrounding circumstances, constituted notice 
reasonably calculated to apprise First Security of Rillingfs 
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interest in the entire property at issue. As a result, Rilling1s 
interest should be given priority over that of First Security 
Financial. 
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